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ABSTRACT: In a post-industrial economy, it is as important to understand “material” productive processes in the 
local community as the processes through which global value chains “expropriate” or “co-opt” common immaterial 
assets. However, the literature on collective action and the management of common goods generally focuses on mat-
ters of the control and governance of material resources. The article commences with an analysis of the relations 
between the production of value, collective action and the rentier nature of contemporary capitalism and its entrepre-
neurial ideology. Then, we present a detailed analysis of the case of mytilid seed capture in the Reloncaví Estuary 
(Los Lagos Region, Chile). This case shows us the failure of modernisation policies which are based on converting 
local producers into modern entrepreneurs. To adopt a successful value strategy, a very different problem must be 
addressed, namely the difficulties of local communities in managing successfully their own common immaterial 
values. Faced with the dichotomous logic of neoliberalism, communities must reunite these immaterial values and 
the associated common material resources, and modulate the friction between them.
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RESUMEN: Acción colectiva y capital simbólico en las pesquerías artesanales: un análisis de los Sistemas Agroa-
limentarios Locales del Estuario de Reloncaví (Los Lagos), Chile.- En una economía postindustrial, es importante 
comprender los procesos productivos “materiales” en la comunidad local como procesos a través de los cuales las 
cadenas globales de valor “expropian” o “cooptan” los activos inmateriales comunes. Sin embargo, la literatura so-
bre acción colectiva y gestión de los bienes comunes generalmente se focaliza en el control y la gobernanza de los 
recursos materiales. Este artículo comienza con un análisis de las relaciones entre la producción del valor, la acción 
colectiva y la naturaleza rentista de capitalismo contemporáneo y su ideología emprendedora. A continuación, pre-
sentamos un análisis detallado del caso del cultivo de semillas de mitílidos en el Estuario de Reloncaví (Los Lagos, 
Chile). El caso nos muestra el fracaso de las políticas de modernización basadas en convertir a los productores loca-
les en empresarios modernos. Para adoptar una estrategia de valorización exitosa, debe abordar un problema muy 
diferente: las dificultades de las comunidades locales para gestionar exitosamente sus propios valores inmateriales 
comunes. Enfrentadas con la lógica dicotómica del neoliberalismo, las comunidades deben reunir estos valores in-
materiales y los recursos materiales comunes asociados, y modular la fricción entre ellos.
PALABRAS CLAVE: economía posindustrial; conocimiento; bienes comunes; valor inmaterial; renta; recursos ma-
teriales; gobernanza.
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INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, special attention has been paid to 
the collective action underlying the reproduction of com-
mon goods such as forests, fishery resources or local farm 
production (Agrawal, 2001). Most of these studies have 
focused on how collective action is oriented towards the 
struggle to deal with endogenous and exogenous changes 
and challenges, and how these affect processes of social 
exclusion and the overexploitation of common material 
resources (Ostrom, 1990; Van Laerhoven and Ostrom, 
2007). Less attention has been paid to the collective ac-
tion of local rural communities for the management of 
their common immaterial assets (Lockie, 2001; Pratt, 
2007), which may be understood, according to Harvey 
(2012), as collective symbolic capital. Currently, global 
assemblies where conflicts and negotiations can develop 
over the co-optation, capture and expropriation of such 
collective symbolic capital are as important as local man-
agement of material production. Consequently, it is es-
sential to understand the interconnection between the 
symbolic capital created around local communities using 
their localized practices and knowledge, and global value 
chains.
It is a fact that the increasingly rentier nature of to-
day’s capitalist elites habitually leads to appropriation 
by external actors of the immaterial value produced by 
these communities, which generally focus their collec-
tive attention on material production issues. The valua-
tion of material products increasingly appears in sym-
bolic production processes, this value is then 
appropriated as a form of income by extra-territorial 
actors or local elites. Such economic dynamic leads, in 
the final instance, to the disempowerment of these com-
munities, in the face of both local elites and multina-
tional organisations. We wonder therefore how “local” 
collectives —as proposed by Escobar (2008)— become 
inserted in global assemblies, where these appropria-
tion processes are developed, how certain cultural rep-
resentations occur and how they favour or hinder the 
exploitation or capture of local immaterial assets by 
extra-territorial actors or local elites.
The article commences with an analysis of the rela-
tions between the production of value, collective action 
and the rentier nature of contemporary capitalism and its 
entrepreneurial ideology. We then present a detailed 
analysis of the case of mytilid seed capture in the Relon-
caví Estuary (Los Lagos Region, Chile), followed by 
some final reflections. A combination of quantitative and 
qualitative study methodologies were used for the case 
study conducted in two stages between 2009 and 2012, 
including ethnographic field work, interviews and focus 
groups with various local actors. In particular, 28 people 
linked to mussel cultivation were interviewed and 8 fo-
cus groups were arranged in each of the locations where 
a project to promote seed collection was being imple-
mented (Fondef- Huam AQ08I1018). The sample design 
was structural rather than probabilistic (Montañés, 
2005; Canales, 2006). At the same time, official statis-
tics from the Chilean National Fisheries Service (SER-
NAPESCA) were analysed in order to check quantita-
tive and qualitative data.
COLLECTIVE ACTION, COMMON 
IMMATERIAL VALUE AND EARNINGS 
IN A POST-INDUSTRIAL ECONOMY
The literature on collective action and the manage-
ment of common goods generally focuses on matters of 
the control and governance of material resources (Van 
Laerhoven and Ostrom, 2007). More recently, attention 
has started to focus on the importance of collective iden-
tity in the sustainability of forms of action and long term 
governance relating to common materials (Araral Jr, 
2009; Meinzen-Dick et al., 2004). These works offer 
dynamic understanding of how communities organise 
themselves, and how their collective identities are trans-
formed according to the changing realities of common 
material resources (Mosimane et al., 2012). Neverthe-
less, an important conclusion is that the different forms 
of organisation and production of material goods are 
based on common local immaterial knowledge which is 
hard to replicate: implicit, informal practical knowl-
edge, artisanal know-how, networks of contacts, infor-
mation, cooperation, exchange of favours, etc. In paral-
lel, these local entities are increasingly mediated by 
reflexive consumption and production processes that in-
corporate exogenous aesthetic values, which are includ-
ed in local production processes (Alonso González, 
2014; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2009). In fact, the col-
lective symbolic capital is a form of social capital that 
acquires a symbolic character precisely through inter-
subjective reflection processes, where knowledge or the 
same material products made by communities may be 
perceived as different by foreign consumers and other 
social groups (Siisiäinen, 2003).
According to Rullani (2004), in a post-industrial 
economy the value of knowledge —and by extension of 
common immaterial values— derives from the combina-
tion of three drivers: the value derived from the interpre-
tative capacity of the consumers of the values and signifi-
cates incorporated into material production; the number 
of times that these values and significates are propagated 
and replicated; and the distribution of the value that they 
produce among the various actors who help to sustain 
them. Thus common immaterial assets are the result of 
the historical crystallisation of an ensemble of practices, 
social relations, physical qualities and ideas developed by 
a human group, which can be perceived by other groups, 
markets or states as “different”, and thus object of a pro-
cess of value attachment. For Harvey (2012), the marks 
of distinction developed by post-industrial capitalism to 
maintain the monopolistic extraction of value through 
earnings on material assets require the participation of 
immaterial common assets, which attach added value 
during this process.
These new value production processes mainly as-
sociated with such common intangible assets cannot 
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be exploited by capitalist elites under traditional forms 
of value extraction specially developed under Ford-
ism. Therefore, the expropriation of common goods 
and their added value is intensified by the generation 
of earnings and the hardening of various forms of im-
material fencing, such as copyrights, patents and 
trademarks (Marazzi, 2008; Vercellone, 2008). Draw-
ing on these rentier strategies, elites waive generating 
a higher overall value, implying a better distribution 
of the benefits of economic activity in the territory 
(Rullani, 2004). But in return, these elites achieve a 
simple and direct appropriation of value, because such 
strategies enable capitalist elites to control market dy-
namics, strengthening their economic power by gener-
ating artificial shortages. In this situation, the struggle 
of local communities to keep control of the value of 
their production no longer derives from the organisa-
tion of material production so much as the control of 
common immaterial goods and their modulation by 
material vectors. Pasquinelli mentions “the profound 
asymmetry between the cultural domain and the mate-
rial economy: value is accumulated on the immaterial 
level but the profits are made on the material one” 
(2008: 150-151).
So the profit is made through the material vector of 
production, which depends on intensive internal fac-
tors, but the earnings extracted from the product are 
derived from other symbolic, dynamic, external quali-
ties in the extensive ambit of the immaterial, which es-
cape the control of the producers (the company’s repu-
tation, perceptions of quality, growth of local or 
ecological consumption, etc.). These external factors 
include consumption patterns and perception of differ-
entiation with respect to other cultures; controlling 
them is fundamental in order to guarantee that external 
actors do not establish monopolistic earnings on the 
common immaterial values of a given community. In 
the area of food production, various instruments exist 
to modulate the relationship between material and im-
material values. They seek to establish symbolic rela-
tionships between the productive processes of a com-
munity and links which may refer to its geography 
(designations of origin or protected geographical indi-
cations, territorial labels, etc.), history (local tradi-
tions), products (varieties of grapes, olives, molluscs, 
etc.), qualities (organoleptic properties, ecological or 
integrated production, sulphite-free wine, etc.), social 
activities (gastronomic fairs, cooking competitions, 
etc.) or forms of know-how (artisanal fishing, farming 
and agro-industrial techniques, etc.). The effectiveness 
of these instruments is determined by the relationship 
between value and power in each particular context. In 
fact, they do not ensure that communities achieve 
greater control over the valuation process (Ray, 1998). 
Additionally, public institutions need to become in-
volved in order for the benefits generated from using 
collective symbolic capital to be translated into locally 
appropriate income. As argued from the theoretical ap-
proach for localized agrifood systems (Muchnick et al., 
2008; Boucher, 2012; Torres Salcido, 2013), it is nec-
essary to take into account the systemic weaknesses 
that do not allow added value to be captured locally. 
The limited sharing of innovation and organizing qual-
ity, through to weak inter-institutional cooperation or 
the non-existent organization of marketing processes, 
greatly influence the results of these economic dynam-
ics. Some of these weaknesses, in fact, seem to con-
strain the case study presented here, portraying in part 
a recurring scenario in the localized systems of food 
production systems, particularly in Latin American 
contexts.
THE MUSSEL SEEDS OF THE RELONCAVÍ 
ESTUARY: THE SYMBOLIC VALUE OF THE 
PRISTINE, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND ITS 
TENSIONS
For at least the last two decades, the Reloncaví Estu-
ary (Cochamó district, Los Lagos Region, Chile) has 
been one of the principal sources for seed of the Chilean 
mussel or chorito (Mytilus chilensis). This industry has 
developed vigorously since 2000, especially due to 
growing international demand for the product and the 
gradual opening up of certain sectors within the Chilean 
economy to foreign investors (Moulian, 2002; Harvey, 
2005). This situation was used particularly by Spanish 
companies interested in mussel aquaculture, who had 
experience in freezing and canning their production. In 
fact, some of these companies were already located in 
southern Chile, although engaged in canning beach sea-
food, with comparatively higher costs (Fernández and 
Giráldez, 2013).
Over the course of a decade, industry growth was re-
markable and this was partly due to a deliberate policy of 
development agencies and investment attraction by Chile 
(Rivas, 2012). This did not extend to salmon and trout 
farming, located in the same territory, nevertheless the 
data are still significant.1 The 2013 harvest reached 
around 250,000 tonnes of mussels, with a total export 
volume of 65,837 tonnes, equivalent to revenue over US$ 
158million (SERNAPESCA, 2013). Chilean mussel aq-
uaculture had a clear export focus, and would reach a 
prominent place in international markets in a few years, 
particularly in Spain, the European Union and the United 
States, exhibiting a typically transnational character in its 
territorial deployment. This can be seen in the participa-
tion and strategic flow of Spanish capital in certain seg-
ments of the mussel value chain. For example, Fernández 
and Giráldez (2013) point out that in 2011 Spanish com-
panies occupied eight of the top 15 places in the export 
ranking of processed and canned Chilean mussels, pene-
trating virtually all segments of the production and distri-
bution process for European markets.
It can be argued that segments in the value chain are 
heterogeneous and differentiated. In the first links 
—seed collection and fattening— producers are capital-
ized to various extents and associated with various eco-
nomic and cultural traditions. In general, some seed 
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collection takes place in areas managed by artisanal 
fishermen and farming associations (as in the Reloncaví 
Estuary), and some fattening is managed by local and 
national micro-businesses, however, both segments con-
tain large companies (including some Spanish ones). 
Meanwhile, the related domestic and international pro-
cessing and distribution markets are generally dominat-
ed by large companies (Bagnara and Maltrain, 2008). 
While there is a strong small business presence in the 
processes described, including export, the nature of the 
mussel has favoured the incorporation of communities 
or artisanal producer associations living near the coast 
in southern Chile. It can be claimed that mussel aqua-
culture by collecting naturally-occurring seeds and fat-
tening them, has been a traditional activity for local 
communities since at least the early twentieth century. 
Mussels could be found in the baskets that families of 
fishermen and collectors delivered to the canning plants 
that had already been installed in the cities of Calbuco 
and Puerto Montt.2
However, community involvement in mussel aqua-
culture would only be possible during the small busi-
ness boom since 2000, and especially due to the inter-
ventions of public and private local development 
agencies that noticed the interest of some artisanal fish-
ermen in small-scale aquaculture. Although small busi-
nesses installed their own seed collectors or hatcheries, 
in certain areas historically occupied by coastal com-
munities the potential to collect comparatively better 
quality seeds was noted (Bagnara and Maltrain, 2008). 
As mentioned, this applies to the Reloncaví Estuary, 
hence the explanation of its “entry” into the mussel 
farming export industry. Needless to say, mussel seed 
collection is a critical and obviously essential link in 
the production process. This was evident in recent 
years when strong international demand meant that 
some companies encountered serious difficulties in 
meeting market requirements, under using their tech-
nological production capacity (Fernández and Girál-
dez, 2013).
The settlements along the extended shores of the estu-
ary (Figure 1) are inhabited by farming families who de-
vote a part of their efforts to fishing for demersal species, 
such as southern hake or cusk eel, or to seafood collection 
along the shoreline. Although this area formed part of the 
traditional itineraries of canoe peoples (Martinic, 2005), 
its recent occupation is due to colonisation processes 
which occurred in the 19th and 20th centuries, connected 
basically with the exploitation of alerce forests (Urbina, 
2011) and subsequently with settlement by families com-
ing from Chiloé Island and the town of Puerto Montt 
(Steffen, 1947), who in the long run adopted a seashore-
farming cultural model (see photograph 1). During the 
20th century this way of life appears to have consolidated 
equilibrium between land and sea, combining logics of 
self-sustainment with strategies of forming links with re-
gional and national markets. The principal products tradi-
tionally sold were —depending on cycles and harvests— 
potatoes, some green vegetables, sheep, native timber, 
fish and seafood. 
As has frequently occurred in Chile, in particular 
since the 1990s, there has been progressive intervention 
Figure 1. Reloncaví Estuary, Los Lagos Region, Chile.
Source: Prepared by Zamir Bugueño.
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in rural areas with projects intended to transform, opti-
mise and/or modernise their production systems. The ob-
ject is to achieve efficient coordination with export mar-
kets. The Reloncaví Estuary was no exception, being 
subject to rapid changes in its use in production based on 
its incorporation into the value chains of marine aquacul-
ture, first of salmonids and almost simultaneously of my-
tilids (Figure 2). These interventions display an alignment 
of private interests with those of the public agency, en-
dorsing an identity dynamic proper to the neoliberal ethos 
imposed in Chile since the 1970s, but which became par-
ticularly entrenched in the post-dictatorship period (Har-
vey, 2005; Larraín, 2001).
In this context —once the seeding potential of the Re-
loncaví Estuary had been established and in conjunction 
with its reputation as a clean natural space in harmony 
with traditional seashore cultures (Skewes et al., 2012)— 
the local development experts (part of the bureaucracy of 
regional public agencies) observed that the shore-dwell-
ers of the estuary should receive specialist assistance. As 
result, towards the end of the 1990s the first projects were 
implemented with the aim of increasing the productive 
and commercial capacity of these economies. There were 
four factors driving the growth of aquaculture in Chile at 
that time. First, the passing of the General Law on Fish-
ing and Aquaculture (1991), which legally established 
and institutionalised species cultivation; second, the in-
terest of public agencies, and especially of some universi-
ties, in promoting sustainable production practices in 
fishing communities; third, the demand of an export mar-
ket (particularly in Spain) which installed in local expec-
tations what some indigenous leaders have called “the 
dream of exporting”.
The fourth factor is even more contextual, less direct, 
but with a significant impact. This is the exponential rise 
of salmon farming in southern Chile. While the history of 
this activity began in the early twentieth century, it gath-
ered particular momentum in the 1990s when a deliberate 
strategy to attract domestic and foreign investment began 
to unfold, in order to configure a growth model and terri-
torial development based on the idea of a cluster (OCDE 
Chile, 2009; CEPAL, 2010). The southern coastal territo-
ry had been called the aquaculture cluster or salmon clus-
ter (Pérez-Alemán, 2005) and this has favoured innova-
tion and growth in the mussel export industry, under a 
common atmosphere of investment. In fact, the interest in 
these opportunities was remarkable, to the point that 
some salmon fishing companies expanded into mussel 
production (Fernández and Giráldez, 2013).
Meanwhile, after very partial interventions, an ap-
plied research project was started between 2009 and 
2012; its object was to improve the capacity to capture/
cultivate Mytilus chilensis seeds of eight communities of 
artisanal fishermen and seashore farmers around the 
shores of the Reloncaví Estuary.3 In particular, the “bene-
ficiaries” of the project were members of the fishermen’s 
syndicates in each of the villages concerned. (Rollizo, 
Cascajal, Cochamó, Bosquemar, Yates, Sotomó, Sotomó 
Bajo and Isla Marimeli). All belong to small settlements 
whose demographics are approximately between 50 and 
100 families. For over ten years these fishermen and 
women had been in contact with agencies and initiatives 
designed to increase their possibilities for mussel farm-
ing. All these interventions, which acted from an objecti-
vising, modernising perspective to achieve structural 
transformation, sought to take advantage of the “produc-
tive vocation” of the territory and the business opportuni-
ties offered by the international market at that time. 
As previously mentioned, the local conditions in the 
territory —with good transport links to and from the Re-
gion’s ports— and the objective quality of the waters 
meant that longlines were soon installed for seed capture 
and fattening in the Interior sea of Chiloé. At first, in the 
1990s, the investors were companies with Chilean and 
Spanish capital. Subsequently, after 2000, there was great-
er interest in local participation among the shore-dwellers 
and artisanal fishermen. So although it is not precisely an 
endogenous practice, at least in the Estuary, it may be said 
—in the case of the fishermen— to be based on a “tradi-
tional culture”. This then is the second immaterial asset 
—after the identity of a pristine space— on which mussel-
farming is based in Chiloé and Reloncaví.
Photo 1. Seashore landscape, Reloncaví estuary.
Culture & History Digital Journal 5(1), June 2016, e005. eISSN 2253-797X, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.3989/chdj.2016.005
6 • Gonzalo Saavedra Gallo and Alfredo Macías Vázquez
TRADITIONAL SEED CAPTURE 
AND APPROPRIATION BY BUSINESSES 
OF THE PRODUCT IN THE PRIMARY LINK 
OF THE VALUE CHAIN
The artisanal nature of these aquaculture practices, 
widespread in the Interior sea of Chiloé, is founded on the 
organisational basis of the process and only indirectly on a 
“tradition” of artisanal or small-scale aquaculture. It may 
be noted that this basis fits in with artisanal fishing and 
coastal peasant farming; we consider that rural, vernacular 
experience in cultivation cycles goes a long way towards 
explaining the relative success of Chilean mussel produc-
tion. It is precisely in this nucleus of the local production 
system that we will find the traditional component of these 
practices, at once indirect and ineludible. On the other 
hand, everything related with specific aspects of produc-
tion proceeds from technological devices “foreign” to the 
artisanal system and/or the local coastal territory, which 
have in fact been “transferred” directly by entrepreneurs 
or through supported development projects. In the former 
case, the aim of the companies has been to obtain higher 
productivity by ensuring a stock of seed from Reloncaví 
as a “traditional” sector with excellent seed quality. Today, 
the entire seed production captured by the farming-fishing 
communities of the Reloncaví Estuary is purchased by 
centres located in Chiloé and Calbuco.4 Figure 3 shows 
that in the district of Cochamó —where the Estuary and 
the eight villages are located— there is practically no fat-
tening, only seed production in the artisanal sector. These 
are data for 2013.
We therefore see that a combination of vectors is in-
volved in the capture, fattening and commercialisation of 
mussel seeds in the Reloncaví Estuary. On the one hand 
there is market demand —European in this case, al-
though a marginal increase in domestic consumption has 
also been recorded— and the incentive from public agen-
cies; and on the other a basis of traditional practices 
Figure 2. Catches of Mytilus chilensis (chorito or Chilean mussel), 1960-2012, Los Lagos Region, Chile.
Source: Prepared by Claudia Torrijos Kneer from statistical yearbooks of the National Fisheries Service (SERNAPESCA).
Figure 3. Seed capture and fattening of Mytilus chilensis, 2013, in Los Lagos Region, Chile. 
Source: Prepared by Claudia Torrijos from statistical yearbooks of the National Fisheries Service.
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which allowed for gradual rooting-adaptation of the log-
ic of aquaculture in local economies based on artisanal 
fishing and farming (Saavedra and Macías, 2012). We 
also see the conventional coordination typical of multi-
national neoliberal capitalism: namely the subordination 
of local production systems to entrepreneurial interests 
and technology, through the functional inclusion of these 
local systems in the spaces “colonised” by these compa-
nies, in a dynamic that can be understood as characteris-
tic of “global value chains” in Latin American rural areas 
(Gereffi et al., 2001). 
In this context we must stress that this functionality 
is defined by the added value of the materiality of this 
seed (quality recognised by the fattening and prepara-
tion companies), and also by the confidence that the 
ecologically pristine waters offer to entrepreneurs, 
which is an immaterial seal. However, just like the tradi-
tional value incorporated into this activity —seashore 
cultivation— these qualities are not passed down the 
consumption chain. In other words, the product is not 
offered for sale with the designation of origin of the 
seed, or territorial trademarks that mention the place 
(Reloncaví Estuary), and much less the coastal commu-
nities. In fact, profit is extracted from the symbolic val-
ues or immaterial assets represented the second link of 
the chain, by the companies that fatten the seed, process 
and export the mussels. 
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC AGENCIES IN SEED 
CAPTURE IN THE RELONCAVÍ ESTUARY
The most common means of seed capture by artisanal 
fishermen is to lay out longline systems with collectors 
consisting of old nets. Most of these systems are located 
in water bodies designated as “temporary occupation per-
mits”, an administrative mechanism introduced —as an 
emergency measure— at the beginning of the 2000s to 
respond to the demand for seeds resulting from a scarcity 
of seed captured in Chiloé and Calbuco (the sites of the 
main fattening centres). These are in the hands of large 
and medium sized companies, who use the symbolic val-
ue of these territories —typically of seashore farming— 
to consolidate the profitability of the product in the mar-
ket. Today, according to unofficial data from the National 
Fisheries Service, more than 80% of the seed sold in the 
region comes from temporary permits (see photographs 2 
and 3). A new law is therefore being drafted by the gov-
ernment to create “collectors’ parks”, and formalise the 
use of temporary permits by replacing them with aquacul-
ture concessions, ideally under syndicate administration. 
As stated by one of the partners at the fishermen’s syndi-
cate in the town of Cascajal:
We have applied for an aquaculture concession, because 
over the years we have only had a temporary permit, 
which requires renewing every year and doing the pa-
perwork, paying for crop lines, paying publicity, and we 
have had to bear this cost, not the syndicate (Interview, 
August 2010).
Other mechanisms for using space, apart from aqua-
culture concessions, are Areas for the Management and 
Exploitation of Benthic Resources —AMERB— desig-
nated exclusively for fishing syndicates by the Depart-
ment of Fishing and Aquaculture.5 The following ac-
count was obtained in a focus group in the town of 
Cochamó, highlighting the combined strategy of using 
both concessions as an AMERB, within a framework of 
formalising the activity, where it has resorted to stand-
ardised administrative figures derived from the public 
agency: 
The final concession is progressing well and we are ask-
ing for two sectors within the area, [so] when the area is 
released we will have a good choice (panel discussion, 
March 2011).
Management and administration have combined col-
lective and individual work, as may be seen in the three 
models described briefly below. They demonstrate the 
structural importance of the market in the productive sys-
tem. At this point it is interesting to note that while these 
are community management models (for seeds and water) 
whose institutional architecture has been transferred from 
the State, in practice they have been reformulated accord-
ing to the organizational dynamics and traditions of the 
communities and the syndicates themselves.
Until a few decades ago, the Chilean mussel was a 
secondary product with low demand in the domestic mar-
ket (Couyoumdjian, 2009). Other products traditionally 
formed the staple of southern benthic fisheries, particu-
larly cholga (Aulacomya ater) and choro zapato (Choro-
mytilus chorus), and later sea urchin (Loxechinus albus) 
and abalone (Concholepas concholepas). Mussel produc-
tion rose quite recently due to the high demand in the 
Spanish market in the 1990s, and especially since the 
sinking of the oil tanker “Prestige” in 2002, which affect-
ed the mussel banks along the shores of Galicia (Garza 
et al., 2006). It was in this context that mussel farming 
began to extend massively in the Interior sea of southern 
Chile. Reloncaví, as mentioned above, played a central 
role in the new scenario, given its optimum environmen-
tal conditions for seed capture. It has become a primary 
production base for the process, the first link in the chain. 
This is the current situation. 
The main initiatives for improving production in the 
Reloncaví Estuary come either from the private business 
sector or the public sector. One probable explanation is 
that the production and export of this species was origi-
nally controlled by entrepreneurs. At the technological 
level, all the consumables imply costs which exceed the 
capacity of artisanal systems, at least at a competitive 
level (Saavedra and Macías, 2012). Furthermore, the 
eight syndicates that we visited between 2009 and 2011 
had capture lines and buoys put in place by companies or 
their intermediaries. This is exactly the same system 
which applies in artisanal fishing. By way of illustration 
we cite a preliminary observation we made after conduct-
ing the focus group in the town of Sotomó:
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The conventional method is for fattening companies 
or entrepreneurs to “set up” a portion of the lines (col-
lectors, for example), subject to an agreement to “de-
liver” the entire harvest to the company (through a 
corporate contract). Prepayments are also used, and in 
this case there is no possibility of setting or managing 
prices. Therefore, production and commercial control 
are completely external (Ethnographic record, May 
2010).
The Estuary space presents an unequal relationship, 
with partial subordination by the companies. On the one 
hand, the aquaculture facilities of the companies occupy 
the best sites (they have been granted concessions on 
large areas) and furthermore they are at the cutting edge 
of technology. On the other, the lines managed by the 
syndicates depend on state subsidies or “support” from 
the companies to ensure their stock and quality. It is true 
Photo 2. Industrial longlines, Reloncaví. 
Photo 3. Artisanal longlines, Reloncaví.
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that the implementation of the HUAM Programme (Hacia 
Una Acuicultura de nivel Mundial – Towards World-
Class Aquaculture), created by the Chilean Government 
in 2002, has enabled some artisanal producers to become 
incorporated into a guided quality management process, 
based on the micro-business model.
We would stress that for artisanal fishermen or local 
producers the FONDEF-HUAM programme, financed 
by the Fund for Scientific and Technological Research 
(FONDECYT), is the most important initiative that has 
been taken, even though the expected results have only 
been achieved in specific cases, and the tendency 
among the syndicates is “not to take advantage” of the 
knowledge “transferred” in the training offered by ex-
perts. Perhaps the best results have been achieved in 
those syndicates which have drifted towards a micro-
business type of productive-commercial dynamic. 
However this has not occurred in the syndicates with 
the most marked community-collectivist basis (see Fig-
ures 4 and 5). 
COLLECTIVE ACTION AND ITS LIMITATIONS 
IN SEED CAPTURE/PRODUCTION IN THE 
RELONCAVÍ ESTUARY
The differential value associated with the production 
of Mytilus chilensis in the waters of the Reloncaví Estu-
ary depends first and foremost on the quality of the seed 
and the cleanness of the clusters of mussels. For example, 
other species of mytilids do not attach themselves to the 
clusters here —requiring their removal, which has a neg-
ative impact on the yield. However, although they form 
the first link in the value chain, and despite the complexi-
ty of the chain as described above, the producer groups 
which form the syndicates have not been able to obtain 
income with a territorial differentiation. There are a num-
ber of reasons for this; some are structural, related to their 
subordinate position, while others are territorial, associ-
ated with the peripheral location of the Reloncaví Estuary 
itself in the marine system of southern Chile.6 A third fac-
tor relates to the hydro-biological conditions: because 
high-quality fattening is not possible in the Estuary, these 
producers —the first link— tend to become invisible or, 
in terms of our theoretical discussion, invisible under the 
logic of territorial subordination in the global assembly of 
the transnational mussel economy. Of course, interven-
tions carried out in recent years (since 2009) have sought 
to create transparency in the traceability of the product in 
order to attach value to quality seed capture in the con-
sumer market (Fondef-Huam Project AQ08I1018, Funchi, 
2009). We have not yet seen the desired results.
In practice, obtaining benefits in the form of income 
for differentiated quality —associated with invisible im-
material values— is restricted by the structure of the 
commercialisation process. Firstly, as already remarked, 
the seed producer syndicates —or rather the fishermen 
who work in seed production— are involved in networks 
of intermediaries, which dims perception of the important 
place of the seed producer in the process. Another aspect 
of this problem is the “laundering” of the product, a strat-
egy based on the use of the existing administrative mech-
anisms (temporary permits or concessions under decree) 
to sell seeds which originate in illegal cultivation sites in 
the Estuary or the neighbouring district of Hualaihué. We 
see therefore that the primary production link is com-
pletely disconnected from the export process, or at least 
from the placing of the final product in the market. It is 
quite clear that there is a problem of control over the eco-
nomic process, and in particular over certain cycles, 
which is a strategic node for potential endogenous devel-
opment. 
There is a further problem with the designation of ori-
gin, as we had predicted. The name Chilean mussel (it 
used to be called “chorito”) follows an export policy 
which transcends endogenous territorial identities and in-
terests. In fact the name “Chilean mussel” is a response to 
the opportunity which has opened up in the Spanish mar-
ket. It has been assumed almost as a matter of public pol-
icy in order to attract private investors. In theory, but only 
in theory, this is supposed to have a trickle-down benefit 
Figure 4. Organisational management models in the capture/
production of Mytilus chilensis seeds, Reloncaví Estuary. 
Source: Authors.
Figure 5. Models of sale/commercialisation of Mytilus chilensis 
seeds through intermediaries in farming-fishing organisations in 
the Reloncaví Estuary. 
Source: Authors.
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for the local populations (Gardner and Lewis, 1996). In 
this context the specific origin of the products is of sec-
ondary importance. Nevertheless there have been —tim-
id, it must be said— proposals through the interventions 
cited above (Fondef-Huam) to give real additional value 
to seed from the Reloncaví Estuary. This is an effect of 
the problem of producing only the base material for the 
final product. As we will see now, neither this nor any 
other possible strategies have been formulated by local 
actors. This is an important point when a link is created 
between collective action and appropriation (or profitabil-
ity) of the symbolic values involved in seed as a product. 
A second consideration is the fact that use of the des-
ignation of origin is limited to artisanal fish farmers by 
law. This arises because, as established in the General 
Law on Fishing and Aquaculture, the exploitation of nat-
ural banks of mytilids is the exclusive right of artisanal 
fishermen. The problem is that seed capture occurs on 
natural mussel banks, and only a few members are regis-
tered as artisanal fishermen with the Fisheries Depart-
ment.
The predominant base organisations for production in 
the coastal communities of the Reloncaví Estuary (small 
settlements of seashore farmers) are the syndicates of ar-
tisanal fishermen. A number of subtleties arise in this situ-
ation. In the first place, the communities do not, strictly 
speaking, exist either as a legal concept or as empirical 
social structures; but nor do any scattered groupings of 
true micro-enterprises exist. For this reason the descrip-
tion of the systems seeks to take into account a hybrid 
economic condition, in which various logics and dynam-
ics (productive and organisational) cross and inter-relate. 
Perhaps one of the principal conclusions that can be 
drawn at this stage is the fact that the eight artisanal 
fishermen’s communities studied in Reloncaví, where 
mussel seed is captured, present variations of a common 
model. So we have a diversity which is limited by its 
own institutional matrix. Of course this includes mussel 
farming, but is not limited to it, since it embraces the 
whole local economic system. In practice we find a 
number of syndicates, which follow three different mod-
els based on different economic-organisational ration-
ales —polarised between collectivist and individualist 
orientations. In order to coordinate some aspects, par-
ticularly state subsidies and programmes, a federation 
has been formed of the syndicates on the Estuary, which 
has also acted as a commercial platform in specific cas-
es. The production and commercialisation model fol-
lowed differs from one syndicate to another, and these 
differences must be established. 
We identified three basic variations of a common 
model for seed capture, and three more for seed commer-
cialisation or delivery. The three variations in capture are: 
1) capture with individual lines in collective waters; 2) 
capture with lines organised by groups in collective wa-
ters; 3) capture with individual lines in individual waters. 
In commercialisation the three variations are: 1) sale-de-
livery by intermediaries; 2) sale-delivery by service pro-
viders; 3) direct sale-delivery. At the harvesting level, 
which comes between these two processes, the models 
combine direct harvesting by syndicate members and the 
hiring of temporary labour. 
The mussel farmers have recently formed a trade as-
sociation: Asociación Gremial de Mitilicultores (AGM). 
The association was created because the “micro-entre-
preneur” mussel farmers saw that an organisation based 
on membership (syndicates and the federation) limited 
their growth aspirations. The organisation consists of 
ten local micro-entrepreneurs, who have remained mem-
bers of their syndicates. Furthermore, the president of 
AGM is also president of the Federation of artisanal 
fishermen.
As has been said, in formal, legal terms the cultiva-
tion system is regulated by the General Law on Fishing 
and Aquaculture, which grants sectors of marine space 
in concession to individuals against presentation of a 
technical project. In general, since the Law was passed 
in 1991, the concessions have been applied for by, and 
granted to, businessmen, especially salmon and mussel 
farmers. This is directly related to their operational and 
financial capacity, required to start up a farming sys-
tem. At the same time the Law established a second ad-
ministrative mechanism for specific portions of territo-
ry, the Areas for the Management and Exploitation of 
Benthic Resources (AMERB). The AMERB were al-
ways intended for syndicates of artisanal fishermen 
and at first were only for management activities. Today 
the AMERB also allow management of other species 
(originally created to avoid the collapse in the produc-
tion of abalone, Concholepas concholepas), and culti-
vation of species like mussel, including seed capture. 
In this framework, as we have stated, the fishermen’s 
organisations in the Estuary have been working in aq-
uaculture activities for slightly over a decade. Their 
strategy has been to combine the two mechanisms, i.e. 
to install capture lines in management areas. This 
avoids the drawn-out process of applying for a conces-
sion, while achieving the technical purpose, and ex-
plains why the institutional basis of the artisanal sys-
tem are the syndicates —for capture, harvesting and 
commercialisation. Nevertheless, today the fishermen 
hold concessions as individuals, and AMERBs as syn-
dicate members.
In practice the logics of institutional management 
tend to combine; i.e. the local models —generally invisi-
ble to public agencies and private companies (Ostrom, 
1990)— end by re-working, with limited and relative suc-
cess, the norms imposed or transferred from the develop-
ment assistance organisations. Perhaps therefore we 
should think in terms of a “hybrid institutions” model 
(German and Keeler, 2010), including co-management 
(Berkes, 2009). But still, the question is a delicate one. 
These are complex processes which in most cases end by 
undermining local institutional matrices or else generat-
ing high impact transformations, particularly in a logic 
focused on the search to maximise the profitability and 
administrative efficiency of local productive spaces 
(Pinkerton and Silver, 2011). To this must be added the 
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financial and logistical cost implied in managing an aqua-
culture concession, particularly considering the irregular 
and scarce liquidity available in artisanal fishing econo-
mies. This limitation can be seen in the following testi-
mony, obtained in an interview with a syndicate leader at 
the town of Yates, revealing a widespread perception of 
artisanal fish farmers that collect seeds in the Reloncaví 
Estuary: 
The most serious problem that we have with the conces-
sion is purely one of resources, since we as members do 
not have the resources to get started even with just a 
few lines, because the investment required is very high. 
(Interview, April 2010).
At the same time, the local re-working of the formu-
las transferred from the public agencies and the market 
(AMERB, aquaculture concessions, temporary permits, 
etc.) express logics of “creative resistance” based pre-
cisely on the reformulation of the modernising “de-
signs” using local institutional capacities and cultural 
experiences (Gudeman and Rivera, 1990; García Can-
clini, 1990; Comaroff and Comaroff, 2009; Escobar, 
2008). The models described above —and all their po-
tential combinations and variations— reflect this, but 
the interesting point is that they are based on the “na-
tive” values of their symbolic and sensory space; in oth-
er words this capacity for reformulation and creativity 
form part of the know-how —and other relational 
forms— of seashore cultures, a know-how in which all 
materiality has an ideational significance (Godelier, 
1990), and which in practice functions as a symbolical-
practical repertory which allows remodelling of social 
and economic life. The question that remains concerns 
the possibility for the local communities who collect 
seeds to retain that symbolic value, with a material or 
even pecuniary expression which is beneficial or at least 
socially profitable, bearing in mind the framework of 
negotiations, tensions and conflicts inherent to global 
assemblies situated in a locality.
CONCLUSIONS
In the Reloncaví Estuary, a combination of environ-
mental conditions and commonly constructed artisanal 
cultivation practices has generated a local production sys-
tem based on the cultivation of mussel seed. Under profit-
ability strategies, the pressures exercised by other actors 
in the value chain (especially marketing and export com-
panies) have resulted in a dynamic of expropriation of the 
collective symbolic capital by these “finders-keepers”. 
The disempowering of the local community is a result of 
incomprehension of how value is generated by artisanal 
fish farmers in a post-industrial economy.
To make progress in correcting these problems, we 
must re-orient the academic debate on the structures of 
governance by which common marine resources are man-
aged (Guthman, 2007; Kirby, Hanich and Visser, 2014). 
The current structure of governance has attempted to in-
troduce other production and distribution systems, e.g. sci-
entific and entrepreneurial, which have tried to improve 
the quality and yield of some aspects of production. How-
ever this structure of governance does not help to increase 
the value retained by the local community, since it is based 
on the rentier strategies of external actors (Sanz Cañada 
and Macías Vázquez, 2005). Rather, this structure redis-
tributes income from one set of actors to another in pursuit 
of a value process which fits better with the logic of mod-
ernisation directed by the “finders-keepers”. If this were 
not the case, it seems obvious that —as with Protected 
Designations of Origin (PDO)— the situation of the arti-
sanal mussel farmers would be considerably improved if 
public institutions were to promote some kind of fencing 
of the material resource, combined with a stronger legal 
capacity of the community to protect the income associat-
ed with the dissemination of a common immaterial value. 
However, for this type of fencing of the material to enable 
the community to capture more income, it would be nec-
essary, in the case of the Reloncaví Estuary, to first 
strengthen the symbolic value of local activities by laying 
more stress on seed production in the preparation of the 
final product. As long as the final product continues to 
play the leading role in the market, the extra-territorial ac-
tors will have a structural advantage in capturing income.
In a post-industrial economy, the local community 
could design a value-creation strategy based on modulation 
of the friction between material and immaterial vectors, 
enabling it to build a collective symbolic capital sustained 
on the productive activities actually carried out in the local 
environment (Macías Vázquez and Alonso González, 
2015). In addition to the income associated with geograph-
ical differentiation (PDO), other immaterial values could 
be brought into play, such as tradition, artisanal practices, 
the environment, the quality of the consumables produced, 
etc. (St. Martin et al., 2007). This would mean developing 
a dynamic, changing value strategy, seeking to tune into 
the wishes and changing preferences of consumers belong-
ing to markets with a tendency towards diversification. In 
fact, PDO also need to be permanently renewed, adopting 
hybrid strategies as soon as territorial differentiation no 
longer represents a sufficient, lasting source of income in 
the current globalisation process.
To summarise, the case of the Reloncaví Estuary 
shows us the failure of modernisation policies which 
are based on converting local producers into modern 
entrepreneurs. To adopt a successful value strategy in a 
post-industrial economy, a very different problem must 
be addressed, namely the difficulties of local communi-
ties in managing successfully their own common imma-
terial values. Faced with the dichotomous logic of neo-
liberalism, communities must reunite these immaterial 
values and the associated common material resources, 
and modulate the friction between them. Progress in 
this direction requires the public sector not only to 
sanction adequate fencing of the material, but also to 
promote the work of cognitive mediators in the field. 
These mediators could work in various ambits and help 
to generate a more effective link between the collective 
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management of common symbolic capital and the abil-
ity of consumers to interpret its meaning. This would 
guarantee better orientation of the material fencing of 
immaterial values, and greater control of the earnings 
by local communities.
NOTES
1 Since 1995, Chile has been the second largest producer of salmon 
and trout in captivity after Norway, even after the crisis of 2008 
when the industry reached its lowest point in 2010, it achieved a 
sustained recovery. Net exports in 2009 were 368,992 tonnes and 
296,903 tonnes in 2010. Exports recovered to 488,124 tonnes in 
2012 and 527,700 tonnes in 2013. (Source: SalmonChile, 2014). 
2 At present we are conducting ethnographic research into the 
economy of the Calbuco archipelago, where we have evidence of 
the experiences mentioned here. DID-UACH S-2015-46 Project.
3 FONDEF-HUAM Project AQ08I1018.
4 Strictly speaking, 100% of the seeds captured in the Estuary are 
used in fattening facilities managed by private companies.
5 A department of the Ministry of Economy.
6 This is particularly the case in Chiloé and Calbuco, which have a 
nationally recognised tradition of artisanal fishing.
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